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FINDING THE LIMIT OF INCOMPLETENESS I
YONG CHENG
Abstract. In this paper, I examine the limit of incompleteness
w.r.t. interpretation. I first define the notion “Go¨del’s first in-
completeness theorem (G1 for short) holds for theory T ”. This
paper is motivated by the following question: whether there is a
weaker theory T than Robinson’s R w.r.t. interpretation such that
G1 holds for T ? In this paper, I show that there are many such
theories via two different methods. The first proof is based on
JeRˇa´bek’s work using some model theory and I show that from
each recursively inseparable pair we can construct a weaker theory
than R w.r.t. interpretation such that G1 holds for it. The second
proof is based on Shoenfield’s work using some recursion theory
and I show that for any Turing degree 0 < d < 0′, there is a
weaker theory than R w.r.t. interpretation with Turing degree d
such that G1 holds for it. As two corollaries, I answer a question
from Albert Visser and show that there is no weakest theory below
R w.r.t. Turing degrees such that G1 holds for it.
1. Introduction
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is one of the most remarkable result
in the foundation of mathematics and has had great influence in logic,
philosophy, mathematics, physics and computer science, as discussed in
[18], [23]. Go¨del proved his incompleteness theorems in [8] for a certain
formal system P related to Russell-Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica
and based on the simple theory of types over the natural number series
and the Dedekind-Peano axioms (see [1], p.3). The following theorem
is a modern reformulation of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem.
Theorem 1.1. (Go¨del-Rosser, First incompleteness theorem (G1)) If
T is a recursively axiomatized consistent extension of PA, then T is
not complete.
The following is a well known open question about G1.
Question 1.2. Exactly how much information of arithmetic is needed
for the proof of G1?
I would like to thank Prof Albert Visser for inspiring discussions of the topic in
this paper, insightful comments on the original version of the paper for improvement
and for introducing some useful papers to me. I would also like to thank Prof Emil
Jerˇa´bek for his patient explanations of his work to me.
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The notion of interpretation provides us a method to compare differ-
ent theories in different languages (for the definition of interpretation,
see Section 2). Given theories S and T , we use S ✂ T to denote that
S is interpretable in T (or T interprets S); S ✁ T denotes that S is in-
terpretable in T but T is not interpretable in S; S and T are mutually
interpretable if S ✂ T and T ✂ S. Whenever we say that S is weaker
than T w.r.t. interpretation, this means that S ✁ T .
G1 can be generalized via interpretability: there exists a weak re-
cursively axiomatizable consistent subtheory T of PA such that each
recursively axiomatizable theory S in which T is interpretable is in-
complete (see [28]). To generalize this fact, in the following, I propose
a new notion “G1 holds for T”.
Definition 1.3. Let T be a recursively axiomatizable consistent theory.
G1 holds for T iff for any recursively axiomatizable consistent theory
S, if T is interpretable in S, then S is incomplete.
The goal of this work is to find the limit of incompleteness w.r.t. in-
terpretation. Toward Question 1.2, in this project, I want to examine
the following question:
Question 1.4. Can we find a weakest theory S w.r.t. interpretation
such that G1 holds for it?
It is well known that G1 holds for Robinson’s arithmetic Q (see [28]).
From [28], G1 also holds for Robinson’s theory R (for the definitions
of Q and R, see Section 2). In Section 2, I review some essentially un-
decidable sub-theories which are mutually interpretable with Q, and
some essentially undecidable sub-theories of Q which are mutually in-
terpretable with R.
As the first step toward Question 1.4, a natural question is whether
there is a weaker theory than Robinson’s R w.r.t. interpretation for
which G1 holds.
Question 1.5. Can we find a theory S such that G1 holds for S and
S ✁R.
In this paper, I positively answer Question 1.5 showing that there are
many examples of such a theory S via two different methods. Firstly,
I show that from each recursively inseparable pair we can construct a
theory S such that G1 holds for S and S✁R based on JeRˇa´bek’s work
using some model theory. Secondly, I show that for any Turing degree
0 < d < 0′, there is a theory S such that G1 holds for S, S ✁R and S
has Turing degree d based on Shoenfield’s work using some recursion
theory. The main results of this paper are Theorem 3.23 and Theorem
3.28.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 1, I introduce
my research question and the main result of this paper. In Section 2, I
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list some basic notions and facts we use in this paper and give a review
of weaker theories than PA w.r.t. interpretation for which G1 holds in
the literature. In Section 3, I positively answer Question 1.5, provid-
ing many examples of weaker theories than R w.r.t. interpretation for
which G1 holds via two different methods. As two corollaries, I answer
a question from Albert Visser and show that there is no weakest theory
below R w.r.t. Turing degrees such that G1 holds for it. In Section 4,
I conclude the paper with some interesting open questions.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, I review some basic notions and facts used in this
paper. Our notations are standard. For books on Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness theorem, we refer to [5],[18], [17], [23], [2]. For survey papers on
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem, we refer to [1], [16], [24], [35]. For
meta-mathematics of subsystems of PA, we refer to [12].
A language consists of an arbitrary number of relation and function
symbols of arbitrary finite arity.1 A theory is a deductively closed set of
sentences in a particular language. For a given theory T , we use L(T )
to denote the language of T and often equate L(T ) with the list of
non-logical constants of the language. For formula φ in L(T ), let T ⊢ φ
denote that φ is provable in T .2 T is consistent if no contradiction
is provable in T . φ is independent of T if T 0 φ and T 0 ¬φ. T
is complete if for any sentence φ in L(T ), either T ⊢ φ or T ⊢ ¬φ;
otherwise, T is incomplete.3 A theory T is locally finitely satisfiable if
every finitely axiomatized subtheory of T has a finite model.
In this paper we always assume the arithmetization of first order
theory with a recursive set of non-logical constants. Let T be a recur-
sively axiomatizable theory. Under this arithmetization, we could es-
tablish the one-to-one correspondence between expressions of L(T ) and
natural numbers. Under this correspondence, we can translate meta-
mathematical statements about the formal theory T into statements
about natural numbers. Furthermore, fundamental metamathematical
relations can be translated in this way into certain recursive relations,
hence into relations representable in theory T . Consequently, one can
speak about a formal system of arithmetic and about its properties as a
theory in the system itself! This is the essence of Go¨del’s idea of arith-
metization. Under arithmetization, any formula or finite sequence of
formulas can be coded by a natural number (this code is called Go¨del’s
1We may view nullary functions as constants and nullary relations as proposi-
tional variables.
2I.e., there is a finite sequence of formulas 〈φ0, · · · , φn〉 such that φn = φ, and
for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, either φi is an axiom of T or φi follows from some φj (j < i) by
using one inference rule.
3I.e., there is a sentence φ in L(T ) such that φ is independent of T .
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number). In this paper, we use pφq to denote the Go¨del number of φ.
For details of arithmetization, we refer to [18].
Given a set of sentences Σ, we say Σ is recursive if the set of Go¨del
numbers of sentences in Σ is recursive. A theory T is decidable if
the set of sentences provable in T is recursive; otherwise it is unde-
cidable. T is recursively axiomatizable if it has a recursive set of ax-
ioms4 and it is finitely axiomatizable if the set of axioms is finite. T
is recursively enumerable (r.e.) if it has a recursively enumerable set
of axioms. T is essentially undecidable iff any recursively axiomati-
zable consistent extension of T in the same language is undecidable.
T is essentially incomplete iff any recursively axiomatizable consistent
extension of T in the same language is incomplete. The theory of
completeness/incompleteness is closely related to the theory of decid-
ability/undecidability. T is minimal essentially undecidable iff T is
essentially undecidable and if deleting any axiom of T , the remaining
theory is no longer essentially undecidable.
A n-ary relation R(x1, · · · , xn) on Nn is representable in T iff there is
a formula φ(x1, · · · , xn) such that T ⊢ φ(m1, · · · , mn) if R(m1, · · · , mn)
holds,5 and T ⊢ ¬φ(m1, · · · , mn) if R(m1, · · · , mn) does not hold. We
say that a partial function f(x1, · · · , xn) on Nn is representable in T iff
there is a formula ϕ(x1, · · · , xn, y) such that T ⊢ ∀y(ϕ(a1, · · · , an, y)↔
y = m) whenever a1, · · · , an, m ∈ N are such that f(a1, · · · , an) = m.
For the definitions of Σn and ∆n formulas, we refer to [18]. A bounded
formula (or Σ0 formula) is a formula which is built from atomic formulas
using only propositional connectives and bounded quantifiers.
Let T be a theory in the language L(T ), and S a theory in the
language L(S). In its most simple form, a translation I of language
L(T ) into language L(S) is specified by: (1) an L(S)-formula δI(x)
denoting the domain of I; (2) for each relation symbol R of L(T ), an
L(S)-formula RI of the same arity; (3) for each function symbol F of
L(T ) of arity k, an L(S)-formula FI of arity k + 1. A translation I of
L(T ) into L(S) is an interpretation of T in S if S proves the following
facts: (1) for each function symbol F of L(T ) of arity k, the formula
expressing that FI is total on δI : ∀x0, · · · ∀xk−1(δI(x0)∧· · ·∧δI(xk−1)→
∃y(δI(y) ∧ FI(x0, · · · , xk−1, y))); (2) the I-translations of all axioms of
T . The simplified picture of translations and interpretations above ac-
tually describes only one-dimensional, parameter-free, and one-piece
translations. For the precise definitions of a multi-dimensional inter-
pretation, an interpretation with parameters and a piece-wise interpre-
tation, we refer to [29], [33], [34] for the details.
A theory T is interpretable in a theory S if there exists an interpre-
tation of T in S. If T is interpretable in S, then all sentences provable
4I.e. the set of Go¨del numbers of axioms of T is recursive.
5For n ∈ N, n denotes the corresponding numeral for n in L(PA).
FINDING THE LIMIT OF INCOMPLETENESS I 5
(refutable) in T are mapped, by the interpretation function, to sen-
tences provable (refutable) in S. Interpretability can be accepted as
a measure of strength of different theories.6 We say that a theory U
weakly interprets a theory V (or V is weakly interpretable in U) if V is
interpretable in some consistent extension of U in the same language.7
I is a faithful interpretation of T in S iff I is an interpretation of T in
S such that for any sentence φ in L(T ), T ⊢ φ iff S ⊢ φI .
A general method for establishing the undecidability of theories is
developed in [28]. The following theorem provides us two methods to
prove the essentially undecidability of a theory via interpretation and
representability.
Theorem 2.1. (1) ([28, Theorem 7, p.22]) Let T1 and T2 be two
theories such that T1 is consistent and T2 is interpretable in T1.
We then have: if T2 is essentially undecidable, then T1 is also es-
sentially undecidable;
(2) ([28, Corollary 2, p.49]) If T is a consistent theory in which all
recursive functions are representable, then T is essentially unde-
cidable.
In Section 3, I will show that G1 holds for T iff T is essentially
undecidable. In the following, I review some weaker theories than PA
w.r.t. interpretation which are essentially undecidable in the literature.
Robinson Arithmetic Q was introduced in [28] by Tarski, Mostowski
and Robinson as a base axiomatic theory for investigating incomplete-
ness and undecidability.
Definition 2.2. Robinson Arithmetic Q is defined in the language
{0,S,+, ·} with the following axioms: (1) ∀x∀y(Sx = Sy → x = y);
(2) ∀x(Sx 6= 0); (3) ∀x(x 6= 0→ ∃yx = Sy); (4) ∀x∀y(x + 0 = x); (5)
∀x∀y(x+Sy = S(x+y)); (6) ∀x(x ·0 = 0); (7) ∀x∀y(x ·Sy = x ·y+x).
PA consists of axioms (1)-(2), (4)-(7) in Definition 2.2 and the follow-
ing axiom scheme of induction: (φ(0)∧ ∀x(φ(x)→ φ(Sx)))→ ∀xφ(x)
where φ is a formula with at least one free variable x.
Robinson Arithmetic Q is very weak and inadequate to formalize
arithmetic: for instance, Q does not even prove that addition is asso-
ciative. Robinson shows that any consistent theory that interprets Q
is undecidable and hence Q is essentially undecidable. The fact that Q
is essentially undecidable is very useful and can be used to prove the
essentially undecidability of other theories via Theorem 2.1. Since Q is
finitely axiomatized, it follows that any theory that weakly interprets
Q is undecidable. In fact, Q is minimal essentially undecidable in the
sense that if deleting any axiom of Q, then the remaining theory is not
6If S ✁ T , then S can be considered weaker than T ; if S and T are mutually
interpretable, then T and S are equally strong.
7Or equivalently, for some interpretation τ , the theory U + V τ is consistent.
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essentially undecidable and has a complete decidable extension (see
[28, Theorem 11, p.62]). Q represents a rich degree of interpretability
since a lot of stronger theories are interpretable in it as I will show in
the following passages.8
Now I first discuss some prominent fragments of PA extending Q
in the literature. IΣn is Q plus induction for Σn formulas and BΣn+1
is IΣ0 plus collection for Σn+1 formulas. It is well known that the
following theories form a strictly increasing hierarchy:
IΣ0, BΣ1, IΣ1, BΣ2, · · · IΣn, BΣn+1, · · · ,PA.
Define ω1(x) = x
|x| and ωn+1(x) = 2
ωn(|x|) where |x| is the length of
the binary expression of x. Let Ωn denote the statement ∀x∃y(ωn(x) =
y) which says that ωn(x) is total. There is a bounded formula Exp(x, y, z)
such that IΣ0 proves that (see [6, Proposition 2, p.299]): (1)Exp(x, 0, z)↔
z = 1; (2) Exp(x, Sy, z) ↔ ∃t(Exp(x, y, t) ∧ z = t · x). However, IΣ0
cannot prove the totality of Exp(x, y, z). Let exp denote the statement
postulating the totality of the exponential function ∀x∀y∃z Exp(x, y, z).
Theorem 2.3. ([11], [6])
(1) For any n ≥ 1, IΣ0 +Ωn is interpretable in Q (see [6, Theorem 3,
p.304]).
(2) IΣ0 + exp is not interpretable in Q.
9
(3) IΣ1 is not interpretable in IΣ0+exp (see [11, Theorem 1.1], p.186).
(4) IΣn+1 is not interpretable in BΣn+1 (see [11, Theorem 1.2], p.186).
(5) BΣ1 + exp is interpretable in IΣ0 + exp (see [11, Theorem 2.4],
p.188).
(6) For each n ≥ 1, BΣ1 + Ωn is interpretable in IΣ0 + Ωn (see [11,
Theorem 2.5], p.189).
(7) For each n ≥ 0, BΣn+1 is interpretable in IΣn (see [11, Theorem
2.6], p.189).
As a corollary, we have:
(1) The theoriesQ, IΣ0, IΣ0+Ω1, · · · , IΣ0+Ωn, · · · , BΣ1, BΣ1+Ω1, · · · , BΣ1+
Ωn, · · · are all mutually interpretable;
(2) IΣ0 + exp and BΣ1 + exp are mutually interpretable;
(3) For n ≥ 1, IΣn and BΣn+1 are mutually interpretable;
(4) Q✁ IΣ0 + exp✁ IΣ1 ✁ IΣ2 ✁ · · ·✁ IΣn ✁ · · ·✁PA.
Now we discuss some variants of Q in the literature. Andrzej Grze-
gorczyk considered a theory Q− in which addition and multiplication
do satisfy natural reformulations of axioms of Q but are possibly non-
total functions. More exactly, the language ofQ− is {0,S, A,M} where
8Nelson embarks on a program in [19] of investigating how much mathematics
can be interpreted in Robinson’s Arithmetic Q: what can be interpreted in Q but
also what cannot be interpreted in Q.
9See [6, Theorem 6, p.313]. Solovay proved that IΣ0 + ¬exp is interpretable in
Q (see [6, Theorem 7, p.314]).
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A and M are ternary relations, and the axioms of Q− are the axioms
Q1-Q3 of Q plus the following six axioms about A and M :
A: ∀x∀y∀z1∀z2(A(x, y, z1) ∧ A(x, y, z2)→ z1 = z2);
M: ∀x∀y∀z1∀z2(M(x, y, z1) ∧M(x, y, z2)→ z1 = z2);
G4: ∀xA(x, 0, x);
G5: ∀x∀y∀z(∃u(A(x, y, u) ∧ z = S(u))→ A(x, S(y), z));
G6: ∀xM(x, 0, 0);
G7: ∀x∀y∀z(∃u(M(x, y, u) ∧ A(u, x, z))→ M(x, S(y), z)).
A. Grzegorczyk asked whether Q− was essentially undecidable. Petr
Ha´jek considered a somewhat stronger theory with axioms
H5: ∀x∀y∀z(∃u(A(x, y, u) ∧ z = S(u))↔ A(x, S(y), z)) and
H7: ∀x∀y∀z(∃u(M(x, y, u) ∧A(u, x, z))↔M(x, S(y), z))
instead of G5 and G7. He showed that this stronger variant of Q− is
essentially undecidable. Sˇvejdar provided a positive answer to Grze-
gorczyk’s original question in [25] and proved that Q is interpretable
in Q− (and hence Q− is essentially undecidable).10
Let Q+ be the extension of Q with the following extra axioms:11 (8)
(x+y)+z = x+(y+z); (9) x·(y+z) = x·y+x·z; (10) (x·y)·z = x·(y·z);
(11) x+ y = y + x; (12) x · y = y · x; (13) x ≤ y ↔ ∃z(x+ z = y). Q+
is interpretable in Q (see Theorem 1 in [6], p.296).
It is interesting to compare Q with its bigger brother PA−. The
theory PA− is the theory of commutative, discretely ordered semi-
rings with a minimal element plus the subtraction axiom. PA− has
the following axioms with L(PA−) = L(PA−) ∪ {≤}: (1) x + 0 = x;
(2) x + y = y + x; (3) (x + y) + z = x + (y + z); (4) x · 1 = x; (5)
x · y = y · x; (6)(x · y) · z = x · (y · z); (7) x · (y + z) = x · y + x · z;
(8)x ≤ y ∨ y ≤ x; (9) (x · y ∧ y · z) → x ≤ z; (10) x + 1  x; (11)
x ≤ y → (x = y ∨ x + 1 ≤ y); (12) x ≤ y → x + z ≤ y + z; (13)
x ≤ y → x · z ≤ y · z; (14)x ≤ y → ∃z(x + z = y). From [29], PA− is
interpretable in Q.
A. Grzegorczyk considered another weak theory, the theory of con-
catenation TC in [9]. It has the language {⌢,α, β} with a binary
function symbol and two constants, and the following axioms:
TC1: ∀x∀y∀z(x ⌢ (y ⌢ z) = (x ⌢ y)⌢ z);
TC2: ∀x∀y∀u∀v(x ⌢ y = u ⌢ v → ((x = u ∧ y = v) ∨ ∃w((u =
x ⌢ w ∧ w ⌢ v = y) ∨ (x = u ⌢ w ∧ w ⌢ y = v))));
TC3: ∀x∀y(α 6= x ⌢ y);
TC4: ∀x∀y(β 6= x ⌢ y);
TC5: α 6= β.
10 The interpretation of Q in Q− in [25] is constructed using the Solovay method
of shortening of cuts.
11The language L(Q+) extends L(Q) and includes the binary relation symbol
≤.
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Andrzej Grzegorczyk proved (mere) undecidability of the theory TC
in [9]. Grzegorczyk and Zdanowski proved that TC is essential unde-
cidable in [10]. However, [10] leaves an interesting unanswered problem:
are TC and Q mutually interpretable? Sˇvejdar shows in [27] that Q−
is interpretable in TC and hence Q is interpretable in TC since Q
is interpretable in Q−. M. Ganea gives a different proof in [7] of the
interpretability of Q in TC, but he also uses the detour via Q−. Visser
gives a proof of the interpretability of Q in TC not using Q− in [32].
S1
2
is a finitely axiomatizable theory introduced by Buss in [3]. From
[6], IΣ0 is interpretable in S
1
2
and S1
2
is interpretable in Q. Note
that TC is easily interpretable in the bounded arithmetic IΣ0. In a
summary, theories TC,Q−,Q+,PA−,S1
2
and Q are all mutually inter-
pretable and essentially undecidable.
In the following, I introduce Robinson’s theory R and some variants
of it. Theory R is introduced by Tarski, Mostowski and Robinson in
[28].
Definition 2.4. Let R be the system consisting of schemes Ax1-Ax5
with L(R) = {0,S,+, ·,≤} where m,n ∈ N and n = Sn(0).
Ax1 m+ n = m+ n;Ax2 m · n = m · n;Ax3 m 6= n if m 6= n;
Ax4 ∀x(x ≤ n→ x = 0 ∨ · · · ∨ x = n);Ax5 ∀x(x ≤ n ∨ n ≤ x).
The axiom schemes of R contain all key properties of arithmetic for
the proof of G1. R is not finitely axiomatizable. Note that R ✁ Q
since Q is not interpretable in R: if Q were interpretable in R, then it
would also be interpretable in some finite fragment of R; however R is
locally finitely satisfiable and any model of Q is infinite. Visser proved
in [34] the following special property of R which provides a unique
characterization of R.
Theorem 2.5. (Visser, [34, Theorem 6]) For any r.e. theory T , T
is locally finitely satisfiable iff T is interpretable in R.12
Since relational Σ2 sentences have the finite model property, by The-
orem 2.5, any consistent theory axiomatized by a recursive set of Σ2
sentences in a finite relational language is interpretable in R. Since all
recursive functions are representable inR (see [28, theorem 6], p.56), as
a corollary of (2) in Theorem 2.1, R is essentially undecidable. Cobham
shows that R has a stronger property than essential undecidability.
Theorem 2.6. (Cobham, [30]) Any r.e. theory that weakly interprets
R is undecidable.13
12In fact, if T is locally finitely satisfiable, then T is interpretable in R via a
one-piece one-dimensional parameter-free interpretation.
13Vaught gave a proof of Cobham’s theorem 2.6 via existential interpretation in
[30].
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Let R0 be the system consisting of schemes Ax1, Ax2, Ax3 and Ax4.
R0 is no longer essentially undecidable.
14 In fact, whether R0 is essen-
tially undecidable depends on the language ofR. If L(R) = {0,S,+, ·,≤
} with ≤ defined in terms of +, then R0 is essentially undecidable.
15
Let R1 be the system consisting of schemes Ax1, Ax2, Ax3 and Ax4
′
where Ax4′ is defined as follows:
∀x(x ≤ n↔ x = 0 ∨ · · · ∨ x = n).
R1 is essentially undecidable since R is interpretable in R1 (see [15],
p. 62). However R1 is not minimal essentially undecidable. Let R2
be the system consisting of schemes Ax2, Ax3 and Ax4′. From [15],
R is interpretable in R2 and hence R2 is essentially undecidable.
16
R2 is minimal essentially undecidable in the sense that if we delete
any axiom scheme of R2, then the remaining system is not essentially
undecidable.17 By essentially the same argument as in [29], we can
show that any r.e. theory that weakly interprets R2 is undecidable. In a
summary, R,R0,R1 and R2 are mutually interpretable and essentially
undecidable.
Up to now, we do not have any example of essentially undecidable
theory which is weaker than R w.r.t. interpretation. Recently, Jerˇa´bek
shows in [13] that there exists a theory T in which all partially recursive
functions are representable, yet T does not interpret R. In the follow-
ing, I give an overview of Jerˇa´bek’s work in [13]. The main motivation
question of [13] is: if a theory represents all partial recursive functions,
does it interpret Robinson’s theory R? [13] positively answers this
question and finds a theory RepPRF which represents all partial recur-
sive functions, but does not interpret R. The proof borrows tools from
model theory: investigating model-theoretic properties of the model
completion of the empty theory in a language with function symbols.
Now I introduce Jerˇa´bek’s theory RepPRF. Let PRF denote the sets
of all partial recursive functions. The language L(RepPRF) consists of
constant symbols n¯ for each n ∈ N and function symbols f of appro-
priate arity for each partial recursive function f . The theory RepPRF
is axiomatized by:
(1) n 6= m for n 6= m ∈ N;
14R0 has a decidable complete extension given by the theory of reals with ≤ as
the empty relation on reals.
15Cobham first observed that R with L(R) = {0,S,+, ·} is interpretable in R0
and hence R0 is essentially undecidable (see [30] and [15]).
16Another way to show that R2 is essentially undecidable is to prove that all
recursive functions are representable in R2.
17If we delete Ax2, then the theory of natural numbers with x ·y defined as x+y
is a complete decidable extension; if we delete Ax3, then the theory of models with
only one element is a complete decidable extension; if we delete Ax4′, then the
theory of reals is a complete decidable extension.
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(2) f(n0, · · · , nk−1) = m for each k-ary partial recursive function f
such that f(n0, · · · , nk−1) = m where n0, · · · , nk−1, m ∈ N.
RepPRF is essentially undecidable since all recursive functions are
representable in it. Since RepPRF is locally finitely satisfiable, by The-
orem 2.5, RepPRF ✂ R. [13] proves that R is not interpretable in
RepPRF. So essentially [13] provides an example of essentially undecid-
able theory which is weaker than R w.r.t. interpretation. However, [13]
is not written in the spirit of answering Question 1.5 and the potential
of the method in [13] is not jet fully explored. In the following section,
I will give more examples of theory S such that G1 holds for S and
S ✁R.
3. Finding the limit of incompleteness
In this section, I answer Question 1.5 positively and show that there
are many weaker theories than R w.r.t. interpretation for which G1
holds via two different methods. Firstly, I show that we can find many
such theories based on JeRˇa´bek’s work using some model theory; and
secondly I show this based on Shoenfield’s work using some recursion
theory. First of all, I give some equivalent characterizations of the
notion “G1 holds for T”.
Proposition 3.1. Let T be a recursively axiomatizable consistent the-
ory. The followings are equivalent:
(1) G1 holds for T .
(2) T is essentially incomplete.
(3) T is essentially undecidable.
Proof. (1)⇒ (2) is trivial.
(2)⇔ (3): It is well known that every consistent recursively axiom-
atizable complete theory is decidable; and every incomplete decidable
theory has a consistent, decidable complete extension in the same lan-
guage (see Corollary 3.1.8 and Theorem 3.1.9 in [18], p.214-215). From
these two facts, T is essentially undecidable iff T is essentially incom-
plete.
(2)⇒ (1): Follows from Theorem 2.1 and (2)⇔ (3). 
As a corollary of Section 2, we have:
(1) G1 holds for the following theories and they are mutually inter-
pretable withQ: IΣ0, IΣ0+Ωn(n ≥ 1), BΣ1, BΣ1+Ωn(n ≥ 1),TC,Q
−,Q+,PA−,S1
2
.
(2) G1 holds for the following theories and they are mutually inter-
pretable with R: R0,R1 and R2.
(3) G1 holds for RepPRF and RepPRF ✁R.
In the following, I first give more examples of theory S such that G1
holds for S and S ✁R based on JeRˇa´bek’s work in [13].
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Definition 3.2. 〈S, T 〉 is a recursively inseparable pair if S and T are
disjoint r.e. sets, and there is no recursive set X ⊆ N such that S ⊆ X
and X ∩ T = ∅.
Definition 3.3. Let 〈A,B〉 be a recursively inseparable pair. Let L be
the finite language {0,S,P} with n = Sn(0). Consider the following
theory U〈A,B〉:
(1) m 6= n if m 6= n;
(2) P(n) if n ∈ A;
(3) ¬P(n) if n ∈ B.
In the following, let 〈A,B〉 be an arbitrary recursively inseparable
pair.
Lemma 3.4. G1 holds for U〈A,B〉.
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, it suffices to show that U〈A,B〉 is essentially
incomplete. let S be a recursively axiomatizable consistent extension of
U〈A,B〉. Let X = {n : S ⊢ P(n¯)} and Y = {n : S ⊢ ¬P(n¯)}. Then A ⊆
X and B ⊆ Y . Since S is recursively axiomatizable and consistent, X
and Y are disjoint recursive enumerable sets. Since 〈A,B〉 is recursively
inseparable, X ∪ Y 6= N. Take n /∈ X ∪ Y . Then S 0 P(n¯) and
S 0 ¬P(n¯). Hence S is incomplete. 
Fact 3.5. ([17, Theorem 2, p.43]) Let A and B be disjoint r.e. sets
and T be an extension of Q. Then there is a Σ1 formula φ(x) such that
φ(x) numerates A in T and ¬φ(x) numerates B in T .18
Lemma 3.6. U〈A,B〉 is interpretable in R.
Proof. By Fact 3.5, there exists a formula φ(x) with one free variable
such that R ⊢ φ(n¯) iff n ∈ A and R ⊢ ¬φ(n¯) iff n ∈ B.19 Thus U〈A,B〉
is interpretable in R via interpreting P(x) as φ(x).20 
Now I want to show that U〈A,B〉 does not interpret R using the main
theorem 5.1 in [13]. Since [13] is not jet published, to make the paper
self-contained, I will prove Theorem 3.18 which is a simplified version of
theorem 5.1 in [13]. From Theorem 3.18, we can show that U〈A,B〉 does
not interpret R. We could view the following presentations as some
reconstructions of JeRˇa´bek’s work in [13] in the spirit of answering my
question of finding the limit of incompleteness w.r.t. interpretation.
Our strategy to prove that U〈A,B〉 does not interpret R is to consis-
tently extend the interpreting theory to a theory with quantifier elim-
ination, using the fact that the empty theory in an arbitrary language
18φ(x) numerates A in T if for any n, n ∈ A iff T ⊢ φ(n¯).
19The proof of Fact 3.5 in [17, Theorem 2, p.43] uses the fixed point theorem for
T . Since the fixed point theorem holds for R, Fact 3.5 also applies to R.
20Another way to prove Lemma 3.6 is: since U〈A,B〉 is locally finitely satisfiable,
U〈A,B〉 is interpretable in R by Theorem 2.5.
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L has a model completion which we denote ECL, the theory of existen-
tially closed L-structures.21 The proof of Theorem 3.18 essentially uses
some properties of ECL. The model completion of the empty L-theory
is well known for finite relational languages L. However, it is much less
known that the model completion of the empty L-theory does exist for
arbitrary languages L as we need here, which was proved by Winkler
in [36] as a corollary of more general results on model companions of
Skolem expansions of model-complete theories (see [13], p.15). In the
following, I give a self-contained argument that the model completion
of the empty L-theory exists which will help us determine syntactically
what open formulas are consistent with the theory. To prove Theo-
rem 3.16, I first review some definitions and facts we need from model
theory.
Definition 3.7. ([4])
(1) A model M is existentially closed if for every model M ⊆ N , we
have M  N : every existential formula with parameters from M
which is satisfied in N is already satisfied in M .
(2) A consistent theory T is said to be model complete if for all models
M,N of T , if M ⊆ N then M  N .
(3) T has quantifier elimination if every formula is equivalent in T to
a quantifier-free formula.
(4) Theories T and S in the same language are companions if every
model of T embeds in a model of S, and every model of S embeds
in a model of T .
(5) A model completion of a theory T is a model companion T of T
such that for any M |= T , the theory T +Diag(M) is complete.22
Fact 3.8. Let M be an L-structure.
(1) If M is existentially closed, then so is M ↾ L for every L ⊆ L.23
(2) If M ↾ L is existentially closed for every finite L ⊆ L, then M is
existentially closed.24
Theorem 3.9. ([4]) Given a consistent theory T , the following are
equivalent:
(1) T is model complete;
(2) All models M |= T are essentially closed models of T ;
21By the empty theory, we mean the theory with no extra-logical axioms.
22For any structureM , we denote by Diag(M) its diagram: the set of quantifier-
free sentences true in M in the language of M augmented by constants for any
element of M .
23This follows from the fact that every extension ofM ↾ L in L can be expanded
to an extension of M in L.
24Suppose M ⊆ N,φ is an existential formula, x ∈ M and N |= φ(x). Let
L ⊆ L be a finite sublanguage containing all symbols occurring in φ. Since M ↾ L
is existentially closed and N ↾ L |= φ(x), we have M ↾ L |= φ(x) and hence
M |= φ(x).
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(3) Every formula is equivalent in T to an existential formula.
Fact 3.10. ([4], [13])
(1) If T is a ∀∃-axiomatized theory, then every model M |= T embeds
in an essentially closed model of T .
(2) If T is an universal theory, a companion T ∗ of T is a model com-
pletion of T if T ∗ has quantifier elimination.
Definition 3.11. ([13]) Let L be a finite language, and Θ be a finite
set of L-terms closed under subterms such that the variables in Θ are
among x0, ..., xn−1, y0, ..., ym−1. Let τ
R
t¯ ∈ {0, 1} for every k-ary relation
R ∈ L, and every t0, ..., tk−1 ∈ Θ. Let ∼ be an equivalence relation on
Θ such that:
(i) If R ∈ L is k-ary, and ti ∼ si for each i < k, then τ
R
t
= τRs .
(ii) If F ∈ L is k-ary, and t , F (t) ∈ Θ and s , F (s) ∈ Θ satisfy
ti ∼ si for each i < k, then t ∼ s.
Then the elementary existential formula ∃yθΘ,∼,τ (x, y) is defined by
(3.1) θΘ,∼,τ(x, y) ,
∧
t,s∈Θ,t∼s
t = s ∧
∧
t,s∈Θ,t≁s
t 6= s ∧
∧
R∈L,t∈Θ
Rτ
R
t (t),
where φ1 , φ, φ0 , ¬φ.
Fact 3.12. ([13]) Every existential formula ∃yθ(x, y) in a finite lan-
guage L is equivalent to a disjunction of elementary existential formulas
with the same free and bound variables.25
Definition 3.13. ([13]) Let L,Θ, x, y,∼, τ be as in Definition 3.11.
We define a subset ∆ ⊆ Θ, and for each t ∈ ∆ a term t∗(x), as follows:
(i) Every variable xi is in ∆, and x
∗
i , xi.
(ii) If t ∼ s ∈ ∆, then t ∈ ∆, and t∗ , s∗.
(iii) If t = F (t0, ..., tk−1) ∈ Θ, and t0, · · · , tk−1 ∈ ∆, then t ∈ ∆, and
t∗ , F (t∗0, · · · , t
∗
k−1).
Define an open formula θ∗Θ,∼,τ(x) as
∧
t,s∈∆,t∼s
t∗ = s∗∧
∧
t,s∈∆,t≁s
t∗ 6= s∗∧
∧
R∈L,t∈∆
Rτ
R
t¯ (t¯)∧
∧
t,F (t¯)∈∆,t∈∆
t∗ = F (t
∗
)
By induction on t ∈ ∆, we have for any t ∈ ∆,
(3.2) ⊢ θΘ,∼,τ (x, y)→ t(x, y) = t
∗(x).
25Let Θ be the set of all subterms of θ(x, y), and ∆ the set of all atomic sub-
formulas of θ(x, y). We can write θ(x, y) in full disjunctive normal form from atomic
formulas in ∆, and switch disjunctions with existential quantifiers. Each disjunct
has the form (3.1), except for the conditions on ∼ and τ . However, it is easy to see
that if ∼ is not an equivalence relation, or if condition (i) or (ii) in Definition 3.11
is violated, then θΘ,∼,τ(x, y) is contradictory.
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Definition 3.14. ([13]) If L is a finite language, let ECL denote the
theory axiomatized by the formulas
(3.3) θ∗Θ,∼,τ (x)→ ∃y θΘ,∼,τ (x, y).
for all Θ,∼, τ as in Definition 3.11 with m = 1. For infinite L, let
ECL =
⋃
{ECL : L ⊆ L finite}.
Note that if L ⊆ L, then ECL is a conservative extension of ECL.
26
If L = L ∪ {ci : i ∈ I}, where ci /∈ L are constants, then ECL is
axiomatized by ECL. In particular, ECL ⊢ φ(c) iff ECL ⊢ ∀xφ(x).
27
Lemma 3.15. ([13]) Let L,Θ,∼, τ be as in Definition 3.11, M an
L-structure, and u¯ ∈ M . The following are equivalent.28
(1) There exists an extension N ⊇M such that N |= ∃yθΘ,∼,τ (u¯, y).
(2) M |= θ∗Θ,∼,τ (u).
The following theorem is a reformulation of Theorem 3.7 in [13].
Theorem 3.16. For any language L, the followings hold:
(i) ECL has elimination of quantifiers;
(ii) ECL is model complete;
(iii) Models of ECL are exactly the existentially closed L-structures;
in particular, every L-structure embeds in a model of ECL;
(iv) ECL is the companion of the empty L-theory;
(v) ECL is the model completion of the empty L-theory.
Proof. By Fact 3.8, we may assume that L is finite.
(i): By (1)⇒ (2) in Lemma 3.15, we have
∃yθΘ,∼,τ(x, y)→ θ
∗
Θ,∼,τ (x)
for each axiom of ECL. By Fact 3.12, every formula with one existential
quantifier is equivalent to an open formula over ECL. By induction on
the complexity of formulas, every formula is equivalent to an open
formula over ECL and hence ECL has elimination of quantifiers.
(ii): Follows from (i) by Theorem 3.9.
26Note that ECL ⊆ ECL and any modelM |= ECL has an extension M¯ |= ECL
such that M is an elementary substructure of M ↾ L since ECL is model complete.
27This follows from the fact that ECL is a conservative extension of ECL and an
expansion of an existentially closed model by constants is still existentially closed.
28(1)⇒ (2) follows from the definitions and property (3.2). (2)⇒ (1): Let N be
the disjoint union of M and (Θ \ ∆)/ ∼, and identify t/ ∼ with t∗(u¯) for t ∈ ∆.
If t0, · · · , tk−1 ∈ Θ, R ∈ L, and t = F (t¯) ∈ Θ, define RN(t0/ ∼, · · · , tk−1/ ∼) iff
τR
t¯
= 1, FN (t0/ ∼, · · · , tk−1/ ∼) = t/ ∼. By Definition 3.11 and the properties
of ∼ and Θ, it is easy to check that the definition is independent of the choice of
representatives. SinceM |= θ∗Θ,∼,τ (u), the definition agrees withM if t0, · · · , tk−1 ∈
∆. We can thus extend the definition withM , and then arbitrarily to the remaining
tuples from N . This definition ensures N |= θΘ,∼,τ (x/ ∼, y/ ∼), where xi/ ∼= ui.
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(iii): By Theorem 3.9, it suffices to show that any existentially closed
L-structure is a model of ECL, which follows from (2)⇒ (1) in Lemma
3.15. By (1) in Fact 3.10, every L-structure embeds in a model of ECL.
(iv): Follows from (iii).
(v): Follows from (i), (iv) and Fact 3.10(2). 
Lemma 3.17. ([13]) If L contains a constant c, and F,R /∈ L are a
k-ary function and relation symbol respectively, then RI(x) , F (x) = c
provides a faithful interpretation of ECL∪{R} in ECL∪{F}.
Proof. Let φ be a (L∪{R})-sentence. It suffices to show that ECL∪{R} ⊢
φ iff ECL∪{F} ⊢ φ
I . Suppose ECL∪{F} ⊢ φ
I and M |= ECL∪{R}.
Define FM : Mk → M be such that FM(a¯) = cM iff RM(a¯). Then
〈M ↾ L, FM〉 has an extension M |= ECL∪{F}. Since M |= φI , we
have M
I
|= ECL∪{R} + φ. Since ECL∪{R} is model complete, M is an
elementary substructure of M
I
and hence M |= φ.
Suppose ECL∪{R} ⊢ φ andM |= ECL∪{F}. M
I has an extension N |=
ECL∪{R}. Then N |= φ. We can extend F
M to N so that FN(a¯) = cN
iff RN (a¯) for all a¯ ∈ N . Then 〈N ↾ L, FN〉 has an extension N such
that N |= ECL∪{F} + φ
I . Since ECL∪{F} is model complete, M is an
elementary substructure of N and hence M |= φI . 
To show that U〈A,B〉 does not interpret R, I use the following impor-
tant theorem due to JeRˇa´bek. The proof of Theorem 5.1 in [13] is not
very easy to read. To make the paper self-contained, here I give a more
detailed and readable reconstruction of JeRˇa´bek’s proof.
Theorem 3.18. (JeRˇa´bek, [13]) For any language L and formula
φ(z, x, y), there is a constant n with the following property. Let M |=
ECL and u ∈ M be such that M |= ∃x0, · · · , ∃xn−1
∧
i<j<n φ(u, xi, xj).
Then for every m ∈ ω and an asymmetric relation R on {0, · · · , m−1},
M |= ∃x0, · · · , ∃xm−1
∧
〈i,j〉∈R φ(u, xi, xj).
29
Proof. By Lemma 3.17 and Theorem 3.16, we may assume L contains
no relations and φ is open. Let p be the number of subterms of φ, and
k = 2256·p
2
. Using Ramsey’s theorem, let n be sufficiently large so that
n → (7)4k. I.e. for any function f : [n]
4 → k, there exists a set X ⊆ n
with size 7 such that f is constant on [X ]4.
Fix M |= ECL, u ∈ M and {ai : i < n} ⊆ M such that M |=
φ(u, ai, aj) for i < j < n. In order to simplify the notation, we may
assume u is given by a constant of L, and write just φ(x, y). Let Σ be
the set of all subterms t(x, y) of φ, and for every i0 < i1 < i2 < i3 < n,
define
f(i0, i1, i2, i3) = {j0, j1, j2, j3, t, s ∈ 4
4×S2 : tM(aij0 , aij1 ) = s
M(aij2 , aij3 )}.
29Recall that a relation R ⊆ X2 is asymmetric if there are no a, b ∈ X such that
R(a, b) and R(b, a).
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f is a colouring of [n]4 by at most k colours. Thus, we can find a
7-element homogeneous set H ⊆ n for f . WLOG, we may assume
H = {0, · · · , 6}.
By homogeneity, note that sM(ai, aj) = t
M(a0, a6) = s
M(ap, aq) for
every 0 < i < j < 6, 0 < p < q < 6 and hence by homogeneity again
sM(ai, aj) = s
M(ap, aq) for all i < j, p < q.
Fix a set of variables {yα : α < m}, and define Θ = {t(yα, yβ) :
〈α, β〉 ∈ R, t(x, y) ∈ Σ}. If t ∈ Θ, let D(t) denote the set of α < m
such that yα occurs in t. Note that |D(t)| ≤ 2. A realization of t
is an injective function h : D(t) → H such that if α, β ∈ D(t) and
〈α, β〉 ∈ R, then h(α) < h(β).30
If h is a realization of t(yα, yβ), define h(t) ∈ M as t
M(ah(α), ah(β)).
A joint realization of a set of terms {t0, · · · , tl−1} ⊆ Θ is an injective
mapping h : D(t0)∪· · ·D(tl−1)→ H such that h ↾ D(ti) is a realization
of ti for any i < l. Note that any pair {t, s} ⊆ Θ has a joint realization
since R is asymmetric. If t, s ∈ Θ, and h is a joint realization of t and
s, we define the relation ∼ on Θ as
t ∼ s⇔ h(t) = h(s).
Lemma 3.19. The relation ∼ is well defined and an equivalence rela-
tion on Θ which satisfies Definition 3.11.
Proof. We first show that the definition of ∼ is independent of the
choice of h. Suppose two joint realizations h, h¯ satisfy h(α) < h(β)⇔
h¯(α) < h¯(β) for all α, β ∈ D(t) ∪D(s). Then we have h(t) = h(s) ⇔
h¯(t) = h¯(s) by the homogeneity for f . Thus, ∼ is a well-defined relation
on Θ.
Clearly, ∼ is reflexive and symmetric. Now we show that ∼ is transi-
tive. Suppose that t ∼ s and s ∼ u. If there exists a joint realization h
of {t, s, u}, then we have t ∼ u since h(t) = h(s) = h(u). If there does
not exist such a joint realization of {t, s, u}, then t, s, u must can be
written in the form t , t(yα, yβ), s , s(yβ, yγ) and u , u(yγ, yα),
where 〈α, β〉, 〈β, γ〉, 〈γ, α〉 ∈ R. Define h : D(t) ∪ D(u) → H as
follows: h(α) = 4, h(β) = 5, and h(γ) = 3. Note that h is a re-
alization of {t, u}. To show that t ∼ u, it suffices to show that
h(t) = h(u). By t ∼ s, tM (a4, a5) = s
M(a5, a6). By the above ob-
servation, sM(a5, a6) = s
M(a2, a3). By s ∼ u, s
M(a2, a3) = u
M(a3, a4).
So tM (a4, a5) = u
M(a3, a4) and hence h(t) = h(u).
Finally, we show that the relation ∼ satisfies Definition 3.11. If
t , F (t0, · · · , tp−1) and s , F (s0, · · · , sp−1) are in Θ, and h is a joint
realization of t and s, it is also a joint realization of each {ti, si}, hence
if t0 ∼ s0, · · · , tp−1 ∼ sp−1, then t ∼ s. 
30Notice that this condition is void if t depends on at most one variable; otherwise
it concerns a unique pair 〈α, β〉.
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Let ∆ ⊆ Θ and {t∗ : t ∈ ∆} be as in Definition 3.13 (for empty x¯).
By induction on the definition of t ∈ ∆, we see that the value of the
closed term t∗ in M coincides with h(t) for any realization h of t. From
this fact and the definition of ∼, we have M |= θ∗Θ,∼. By Lemma 3.15,
since M is existentially closed, we have
M |= ∃y0, · · · , ym−1θΘ,∼(y¯).
Take b0, · · · , bm−1 ∈M such that M |= θΘ,∼(b¯).
Lemma 3.20. For 〈α, β〉 ∈ R, i < j ∈ H and any subformula ϕ of φ,
we have
M |= ϕ(bα, bβ)⇔M |= ϕ(ai, aj).
Proof. It suffices to consider the case that ϕ is an atomic formula in the
form s(x, y) = t(x, y). Then M |= ϕ(bα, bβ) iff s
M(bα, bβ) = t
M(bα, bβ).
Since M |= θΘ,∼(b¯), s
M(bα, bβ) = t
M(bα, bβ) iff s(yα, yβ) ∼ t(yα, yβ).
Define h : {α, β} → H by h(α) = i and h(β) = j. Note that h
is a realization of {s(yα, yβ), t(yα, yβ)}. Then s(yα, yβ) ∼ t(yα, yβ) iff
h(s(yα, yβ)) = h(t(yα, yβ)) iff s
M(ai, aj) = t
M(ai, aj) iff M |= ϕ(ai, aj).

By Lemma 3.20, we have M |=
∧
〈α,β〉∈R φ(bα, bβ). 
Definition 3.21. Consider the following theory T in the language 〈∈〉
axiomatized by the sentences ∃z, x0, · · · , xn−1(
∧
i<j<n xi 6= xj ∧∀y(y ∈
z ↔
∨
i<n y = xi)) for all n ∈ ω.
Proposition 3.22. (1) T is not weakly interpretable in ECL for any
language L.
(2) R is not weakly interpretable in ECL for any language L.
(3) If R is interpretable in U〈A,B〉, then R is weakly interpretable in
ECL for some language L.
Proof. (1): Suppose this does not hold and apply Theorem 3.18 to the
formula which interprets
∧
i<j<n xi 6= xj ∧ ∀y(y ∈ z ↔
∨
i<n y = xi)
and R a chain longer than n to get a contradiction.
(2): Note that T is interpretable in R. Since T is not weakly inter-
pretable in ECL for any language L, R is not weakly interpretable in
ECL for any language L.
(3): By Theorem 3.16, every consistent existential theory is consis-
tent with ECL for some language L. 
Theorem 3.23. For any recursively inseparable pair 〈A,B〉, there is
a theory U〈A,B〉 such that G1 holds for U〈A,B〉 and U〈A,B〉 ✁R.
31
31However, Theorem 3.23 does not tell us more information about the theory
U〈S,T 〉 and U〈U,V 〉 for different recursively inseparable pairs 〈S, T 〉 and 〈U, V 〉. E.g.
whether U〈S,T 〉 and U〈U,V 〉 have the same Turing degree or the same strength w.r.t.
interpretation.
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Proof. From (2) and (3) in Proposition 3.22, R is not interpretable in
U〈A,B〉. From Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.6, we have G1 holds for U〈A,B〉
and U〈A,B〉 ✁R. 
Theorem 3.24. (JeRˇa´bek, [13]) For Σ2-axiomatized theory T , T is
interpretable in a consistent existential theory iff T is weakly inter-
pretable in ECL for some language L.
As a corollary of Theorem 3.24 and (2) in Proposition 3.22, any
consistent existential theory does not interpret R. So, from this and
Theorem 2.5, if a consistent existential theory S is essentially undecid-
able and locally finitely satisfiable, then G1 holds for S and S✁R (i.e.
S is a solution for Question 1.5).
In the following, I will give more examples for Question 1.5 and
improve Theorem 3.23 based on Shoenfield’s work via recursion theory.
The proof of Theorem 3.28 is based on Shoenfield’s Theorem 3.26. To
make the reader have better sense of the essentially undecidable theory
we have, I add the proof of Shoenfield’s Theorem 3.26 from [22] which
essentially uses Theorem 3.25.
Theorem 3.25. (Shoenfield, [22, Theorem 1]) If A is recursively enu-
merable and not recursive, there is a recursively inseparable pair 〈B,C〉
such that A, B and C have the same Turing degree.
Theorem 3.26. (Shoenfield, [22, Theorem 2]) Let A be recursively
enumerable and not recursive. Then there is a consistent axiomatiz-
able theory T having a finite number of constants which is essentially
undecidable and has the same Turing degree as A.
Proof. By Theorem 3.25, pick a recursively inseparable pair 〈B,C〉
such that A, B and C have the same Turing degree. Now we define the
theory T with L(T ) = {R} where R is a binary relation symbol. Theory
T contains axioms asserting that R is an equivalence relation. Let Φn
be the statement that there is an equivalence class of R consisting of
n elements. Then as further axioms we adopt Φn for all n ∈ B and
¬Φn for all n ∈ C. Finally, for each n we adopt an axiom asserting
there is at most one equivalence class having n elements. Clearly T is
consistent and axiomatizable. Using models, we see Φn is provable iff
n ∈ B, and ¬Φn is provable iff n ∈ C. Hence B and C are recursive
in T . Using Lemma 2 of [14], since no two equivalence classes have the
same number of elements, every sentence φ of T is equivalent to a truth
function of the Φn, and that this truth function may be calculated from
φ. It follows that T is recursive in B and C. Hence T has the same
Turing degree as A.
Finally, we show that T is essentially undecidable. Suppose T has a
consistent decidable extension S. Let D be the set of n such that Φn
is provable in S. Then D is recursive, B ⊆ D, and C ∩D = ∅ which
contradicts the fact that 〈B,C〉 is a recursively inseparable pair. 
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The following theorem due to Visser is essentially used in the proof
of Theorem 3.28.
Theorem 3.27. (Visser, [31]) If U is a r.e. theory which weakly in-
terprets Q, then if V is interpretable in U , then V is faithfully inter-
pretable in U .
In the following, I will prove Theorem 3.28 which improves Shoen-
field’s Theorem 3.26. I first give an overview of the idea of the proof.
Let d be a Turing degree with 0 < d < 0′.
Step One: By Shoenfield’s theorem, there is a consistent axiom-
atizable essentially undecidable theory S such that S has Turing
degree d.
Step Two: Consider the product theory S⊗R of S and R which
has the following axioms: P → X if X is a S-axiom; ¬P → Y
if Y is a R-axiom where P is a 0-ary relation symbol. We show
that S ⊗R is essentially undecidable and S ⊗R✂R.
Step Three: If R is faithfully interpretable in r.e. theory S, then
S has Turing degree 0′.
Step Four: We show that R is not interpretable in S ⊗R.
So G1 holds for S ⊗R, S ⊗R✁R and S ⊗R has Turing degree d.
Theorem 3.28. For any Turing degree 0 < d < 0′, there is a theory
U such that G1 holds for U , U ✁R and U has Turing degree d.32
Proof. Let d be a Turing degree with 0 < d < 0′. By Shoenfield’s
theorem, pick an essentially undecidable theory S such that S has
Turing degree d. Take the product theory S ⊗ R defined as above.
Firstly, I show that G1 holds for S ⊗R.
Lemma 3.29. S ⊗R is essentially undecidable..
Proof. Suppose U is a consistent decidable extension of S ⊗R. Define
X = {〈pφq, pψq〉 : U ⊢ P → φ or U ⊢ ¬P → ψ}. Since U is decidable,
X is recursive. Note that S ⊆ (X)0 and R ⊆ (X)1. I claim that
at least one of (X)0 and (X)1 is consistent. If both (X)0 and (X)1
are inconsistent, then U ⊢ (P →⊥) and U ⊢ (¬P →⊥). So U ⊢⊥
which contradicts that U is consistent. WLOG, we assume that (X)0
is consistent. Then (X)0 is consistent decidable extension of S which
contradicts that S is essentially undecidable. 
It is easy to show that S⊗R is interpretable in R (i.e. S⊗R✂R):
take the identity interpretation on the R side and interpret P as ⊥.
Lemma 3.30. S ⊗R does not interpret R.
32I would like to thank Prof Albert Visser for introducing Shoenfield’s paper to
me and the idea of using Shoenfield’s paper to give new examples of theories for
Question 1.5 is due to him.
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Proof. Suppose R is interpretable in S⊗R. Since R weakly interprets
Q, S ⊗R weakly interprets Q. By Theorem 3.27, since S ⊗R weakly
interprets Q and R is interpretable in S ⊗R, we have R is faithfully
interpretable in S ⊗R.
Lemma 3.31. If R is faithfully interpretable in the r.e. theory S, then
S has Turing degree 0′.
Proof. Let I be the faithful interpretation of R in S. It suffices to show
that any r.e. set A is Turing reducible to S. By the Σ1-completeness
of R, any r.e. set is representable in R. Then there is a formula φ(x)
such that for any n ∈ N, if n ∈ A, then R ⊢ φ(n¯); if n /∈ A, then
R ⊢ ¬φ(n¯). Since R ⊢ φ(n¯) iff S ⊢ φI(n¯) and R is consistent, we have
n ∈ A iff S ⊢ φI(n¯). So A is Turing reducible to S. 
Since R is faithfully interpretable in S ⊗R, by Lemma 3.31, S ⊗R
has Turing degree 0′. One the other hand, R has Turing degree 0′ by
Lemma 3.31 and hence S⊗R has Turing degree d < 0′ which leads to
a contradiction. 
So S ⊗ R ✁ R, G1 holds for S ⊗ R and S ⊗ R has Turing degree
d. 
As a corollary of Theorem 3.23, we can answer a question from Al-
bert Visser: would S with S ✂R such that G1 holds for S shares the
universality property of R that every locally finitely satisfiable theory
is interpretable in it. The answer for this question is negative. We
have shown that for any recursively inseparable pair 〈A,B〉, there is a
theory U〈A,B〉 such that G1 holds for U〈A,B〉 and U〈A,B〉✁R. R is locally
finitely satisfiable, but R is not interpretable in U〈A,B〉.
33 Hence, for
any recursively inseparable pair 〈A,B〉, the theory U〈A,B〉 is a coun-
terexample for Visser’s Question. Moreover, from Theorem 3.28, for
any Turing degree 0 < d < 0′, there is a theory U ✂ R with Turing
degree d such that G1 holds for U , but the locally finitely satisfiable
theory R is not interpretable in U (i.e. theory U is a counterexample
for Visser’s Question). This shows the speciality of R: Theorem 2.5
provides a unique characterization of R.
Define D = {S : S✁R and G1 holds for S}. Let R be the structure of
the r. e. degrees with the ordering ≤T induced by Turing reducibility
with least element 0 and greatest element 0′.
Theorem 3.32. (1) (Sacks, Embedding theorem, [20]) Every count-
able partial ordering can be embedded into R.
33Take another example: the locally finitely satisfiable theory T as in Definition
3.21 is not interpretable in U〈A,B〉 since if T is interpretable in U〈A,B〉, then T is
weakly interpretable in ECL for some language L which contradicts (1) in Corollary
3.22.
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(2) (Sacks Density Theorem, [21]) For every pair of nonrecursive
r.e. degrees a <T b there is one c such that a <T c <T b.
From Theorem 3.32, the structure 〈R, <T 〉 is not well founded and
has incomparable elements.
Corollary 3.33. (D, <T) is not well founded and has incomparable
elements.
So, by Theorem 3.28, there is no weakest theory below R w.r.t. Tur-
ing degrees such that G1 holds for it.
4. Questions
A natural question is: is Q the weakest finitely axiomatized the-
ory extending R w.r.t. interpretation such that G1 holds for Q? The
following theorem tells us the answer is no.
Theorem 4.1. (Visser, [29, Theorem 2]) Suppose R ⊆ A, where A
is finitely axiomatized and consistent. Then, there is a finitely axiom-
atized B such that R ⊆ B ⊆ A and B ✁ A.
Define X = {S : R✂S✁Q}. Theorem 4.1 shows that the structure
(X,✁) is not well founded.
Theorem 4.2. (Visser, [29, Theorem 12]) Suppose A and B are
finitely axiomatized theories that weakly interpret S1
2
. Then there are
finitely axiomatized theories A ⊇ A and B ⊇ B such that A and B are
incomparable (i.e. A 5 B and B 5 A).
Theorem 4.2 shows that there are incomparable theories extending
Q. We could naturally ask whether the similar results as in Theorem
4.1 and Theorem 4.2 apply to the structure (D,✁).
I conclude the paper with two interesting open problems for future
research.
Question 4.3. (1) Is (D,✁) well founded?
(2) Are any two elements of (D,✁) comparable?
However, by Corollary 3.33, we have the answer for Question 4.3
w.r.t. Turing degrees.
Conjecture 4.4. (D,✁) is not well founded and has incomparable
elements.
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